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LAw AND MINIMUM WoRLD PUBLIC ORDER. By Myres S. McDougal and 
Florentino P. Feliciano. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1961. Pp. 872. 
$12.50. 
The authors' descriptive title of this exhaustive treatise is "The Legal 
Regulation of International Coercion." There is great merit in the schol-
arly treatment given this subject for scholars have always been the leaders 
in the definition and advancement of international law. However, the 
authors have not been content merely to set forth philosophical principles 
but have marshalled their orderly conclusions for the practical benefit of 
the decision-makers in the world arena. 
At the outset legal scholars are taken to task for speaking from one or 
the other of two attitudes, each detrimental to the goal of a "world public 
order honoring human dignity." The first group accepts and "affirms that 
man's destructive impulses and instruments of violence have escaped" 
beyond the control of law. (p. 2) In the alternative there is an over-
emphasis on formal concepts and rules, such as the not uncommon reliance 
of the second group of writers upon the two conditions of "war" and 
"peace" to the exclusion of all others. 
In the analysis of practices and decisions the authors distinguish be-
tween the "factual process of international coercion and the process of 
authoritative decision" in the regulation of international coercion. Such a 
distinction will lead scholars and decision-makers toward "alternatives 
in the formulation and application of policy better designed to promote a 
world public order embodying the values commonly characterized as those 
of human dignity in a society of freedom and abundance." (pp. 10-11) 
It is interesting to note that the authors find a new sanction for the 
violation of the law of war in the common interest of all participants in 
minimizing unnecessary destruction of values or, as often stated, economy 
in the use of force. Even the so-called "nuclear stalemate" which has 
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brought forward discussion of "limited war" stems from the same principle 
of economy in the use of force. 
Having set the stage for the decision-makers the authors analyze, in 
magnificient detail, the various stages of the process of coercion in the 
world arena, from initiation to termination. The writers who insist upon 
an exact answer to the question "When does war begin?" are criticized for 
failing to recognize the importance of many variables such as participants, 
objectives, methods, conditions and continuity and "that the initiation of 
coercion generates, not one unitary problem of ascertaining a precise mo-
ment of time for the beginning of a singularly elusive and all-sufficing 
'legal state of war,' but rather a whole series of complex problems." (p. 100) 
In the chapter entitled "Resort to Coercion" aggression and self-
defense are the principal topics and are intimately related to the theme 
of this volume. Thus, it is stated that there is "increasing awareness that 
efficient world institutions for the optimum creation and distribution of 
values depend upon the securing of minimum order," and that this requires 
"effective community controls" of "the processes of coercion and violence 
among nation-states." (p. 122) Complementary and fundamental prescrip-
tions of permissible and nonpermissible coercion are necessary both in 
theory and practice. 
The conception of bellum iustum which had been superseded by a 
recognition of the finality of decision has reappeared in the attempts under 
the League of Nations and the United Nations to distinguish legal and 
illegal coercion. Rejecting the usefulness of stark definitions in this area 
of permissible and nonpermissible coercion the authors outline the steps 
necessary to establish community policies applicable thereto. The different 
types of decision-makers must be identified; an analysis of the initiating 
coercion particularly with respect to priority is necessary, and considera-
tion must be given to the character of the participants, the nature of the 
participants' objectives, the kind of coercion and the relationship to com-
munity procedures. 
The discussion of the requirements of permissible self-defense is es-
pecially interesting and apropos. It abounds with reflections on past ex-
amples of coercion allegedly based on self-defense coupled with treatment 
of theoretical situations. Here as elsewhere the authors ultimately specify 
the detailed considerations designed to lead the decision-makers, be they 
executives, military leaders, or judges, toward appropriate conclusions. 
To secure world public order the authors point the way to minimum 
order which they describe as "freedom from expectations of severe depriva-
tions by unauthorized coercion and violence." (p. 261) To implement or 
sanction the principle of minimum order there is required not only the 
invention and establishment of varied sanctioning practices but also the 
"creation and fostering of the necessary predispositions in effective decision-
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makers to put such structures and procedures in operation." (p. 263) 
It is recognized that in theory the sanction of force has its detractors and 
in practice its failures, yet it remains an effective agent in maintaining 
world order. But it is not the only sanction in this field of international 
law. An important one is, of course, world opinion. Another and unusual 
one advanced by the authors is the recognition by States that international 
law is binding upon them. 
The section on strategies is well adapted to practical use, being less 
afflicted with tautology, an apparent defect of much of this volume. 
Extensive treatment is given to the relationship of neutrality to the 
process of legal regulation of international coercion. This relationship 
derives its validity from the aspect of participation or nonparticipation 
in coercion. Proceeding upon the assumption that a State may, under 
present conditions, be neutral as respects belligerents, the authors never-
theless recognize the present obligation of States under the United Nations 
Charter's characterization of unlawful coercion. Of this extensive chapter 
on neutrality it may be said that the complementary claims of participants 
and nonparticipants are admirably treated in the context of existing and 
former community rules, and also with reference to rules derived from 
customary international law. Especially enlightening is the discussion of 
the extent of a belligerent's right to embargo economic intercourse with 
the enemy. 
In the chapter on "Community Regulation of Combat Situations" the 
authors move bravely into the fray of current discussion concerning the 
principles of war, i.e., the principles of necessity, humanity, and chivalry. 
The last is quickly buried in the graveyard of feudalism. The interest of 
the authors in human dignity in its broadest concept fosters implicit 
recognition of the current applicability in combat of the principle of 
humanity. This recognition is made easier by equating the principle of 
humanity with that of economy of force or minimum destruction of values. 
As in other modem treatment there is a strict limitation placed upon the 
use of the principle of military necessity. 
Continuing the discussion of combat situations the authors consider 
claims with respect to permissible combatants. Significant observations 
are made with respect to the trend of recent opinion concerning partisans 
or guerrillas, a matter of present consideration in legal theory among the 
publicists, and a matter of importance in current practice as well. Claims 
with respect to permissible "Objects of Attack" are assessed in the light of 
the principles of military necessity and minimum destruction of values. 
People, resources and institutions are the categories considered, principally 
in the light of decisions of War Crimes Tribunals and national courts and 
speculation on the effects of nuclear warfare. This chapter is especially 
useful since it is filled with logical conclusions, designed to assist both the 
codifier and the decision-maker. 
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Among the "Claims With Respect to Permissible Instruments and Means 
of Attack" are those relating to submarines and nuclear weapons. As to 
the former it is said that "The submarine as a weapon of war has raised 
important, continuing legal issues." (p. 626) Concerning the latter the 
authors conclude "that processes of derivation and 'analogy' from con-
ventional rules and from inherited principles are hopelessly inadequate to 
sustain assertions, in realistic expectation of probable future decision, of 
a comprehensive prohibition in international law of the use of nuclear 
weapons .... A more promising alternative for limitation of nuclear vio-
lence may conceivably reside in the curious paradox that the capability 
and reciprocal promise of mutual annihilation is today widely regarded as 
a basic condition for keeping peace between the polar powers." (pp. 667-68) 
Especially for the guidance of judges as decision-makers there is ade-
quate treatment of jurisdiction and procedure in war crimes trials. In the 
chapter on "Belligerent Occupation" the authors display a commendable 
interest in a basic problem, the authority of the occupant to alter funda-
mental institutions. Lacking judicial construction of this limitation, de-
tailed attention is given to the Allied occupation of Germany where, for 
example, the denazification was challenged as being inconsistent with the 
Hague Regulations. As to coercive measures by the occupant the authors 
indicate that the simple approach by the decision-maker is to accom-
modate the security interests of the occupant with the human rights of 
the inhabitants. In passing, this reviewer suggests that the phrase "security 
interests of the occupant" is too narrow a concept to encompass all of the 
occupant's recognized rights. 
Overall contemplation of this complex yet learned treatise impels the 
suggestion that the voluminous treatment may detract from its practicality 
unless an authoritative condensation, phrased in the customary terms of 
the varied contexts, is provided for the decision-makers who usually lack 
the time to absorb and appreciate fully the complex bases for action set 
forth in this volume. However, this is not intended to detract from the 
commendations due the authors for their success in pointing the way 
toward the attainment of peace and the enhancement of human dignity. 
Claude B. Mickelwait 
Major General, 
U.S. Army, Retired 
